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Abstract 
This paper analyses the national tax treatment of interest expenditures of multinational 
enterprises in a non-cooperative world. It is shown that the international tax system generally 
leads to distortions in the capital decisions of multinational firms. In contrast to the existing 
literature on the tax treatment of the expenditures of multinationals, it is found that the form and 
size of distortions can differ per country depending on the stake a country has in the 
multinational. Furthermore, internationalisation of the firm's operations and ownership is 
demonstrated to lead to less generous interest deduction rules of individual countries and in the 
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JEL classification: F21, F23, H21, H32 
Key words: International Investment, Multinational Firms, Optimal Taxation, Interest 
Expenditures, R&D Expenditures 
 
 
                                                                 
* We are grateful to Anthony Atkinson, Lans Bovenberg, Harry Huizinga, Lex Meijdam, Bert Brys and 
participants of the 55-th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Moscow, Russia, 23-
26 August 1999) for discussions and comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Erasmus University Rotterdam 
2 Research Center for Economic Policy (OCfEB) 
3 Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Correspondence to: Joulia Ossokina, Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, P.O.Box 1738, 3000 DR, 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands; email: ossokina@few.eur.nl 
 
 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
The deduction of interest expenditures when calculating taxable income is generally permitted 
across countries. Multinational corporations can exploit the deduction possibility in order to 
minimise the world-wide income tax payable, by shifting their liabilities to those countries with the 
highest tax rates and most favourable interest deduction rules. Countries, in their turn, are able to 
reduce the possibilities for debt shifting, usually by requiring the apportionment of overall interest 
expenditures to home and foreign income according to some rule. Altshuler and Mintz (1994) and 
Froot and Hines (1994) have empirically examined the effect of stricter interest allocation rules 
aimed at preventing the debt shifting, on the behaviour of multinationals. They found that the 
stricter interest allocation rules of the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the USA induced the multinationals 
to alter the location of their debt, but also to scale back the scope of their operations. Thus, when 
deciding about the tax treatment of interest expenditures of multinationals, national states are likely 
to face a trade-off between allowing for the erosion of the corporate tax revenue base due to debt-
shifting and negatively affecting the production at home and world-wide. Such a trade-off may be a 
possible explanation for the fact that the apportionment approach, although correcting for distortions 
introduced by debt shifting, has hitherto been used by relatively few countries.  
 
Currently, no common rule exists as to how individual countries should attribute interest 
expenditures of multinationals to geographical sources of taxable income. The interest deduction 
rules diverge widely across countries. First, a large number of countries use the tracing approach 
(the use of borrowed funds is traced based on all the facts and circumstances; if money is shown to 
be used to earn income from a particular qualifying source, interest is deductible, otherwise it is 
not). Second, some countries apply the apportionment approach involving allocation of borrowed 
funds to the taxpayer’s sources of income according to some formulae; these formulae usually 
describe the way to determine the fraction of world-wide interest expenditures which is allowed for 
deduction. Furthermore, the apportionment formulae used differ significantly per country and may 
be based on the value of the taxpayer’s income-earning assets in the country (as in the US), but also 
on other criteria such as gross revenue or taxable income in the country. Thus, the treatment of the 
interest expenditures by the world tax systems may be characterised by the extensive use of the 
tracing approach, which is generally known to provide stronger incentives for debt shifting across 
countries, together with the lack of uniformity with respect to apportionment rules. This suggests 
that countries under certain conditions might have reasons to stay lax in terms of capturing the 
income tax base, in order to avoid distortions in capital and production decisions which can be 
created when eliminating debt-shifting.  
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This paper analyses the national tax treatment of the multinational's interest expenditures under the 
apportionment approach, and the distortions this approach can introduce with respect to capital 
decisions of a multinational1. A general feature of permitting the deduction of a fraction of world-
wide interest expenditures is that a more generous allowance in a single country leads to an increase 
in debt and production not only in this country, but also world-wide. In a non-cooperative world 
countries determine their policies with respect to the interest deduction rules independently, and 
rules of one tax jurisdiction where the multinational operates do not have to be recognised by 
another tax jurisdiction. This means that the deduction parameters world-wide do not necessarily 
sum to unity, that is it might be the case that the multinational cannot include in the production costs 
all the interest expenditures incurred, what leads to distortions in capital decisions of the company. 
Furthermore, given that capital decisions are taken by the multinational for each country separately, 
the world-wide tax system can result in different degrees of distortion per country.  
 
In the current analysis we specifically address how the character and size of the distortions countries 
face are influenced by both the increasing internationalisation of the firm in terms of operations, and 
the stake countries have in the firm’s equity. The model of the paper is to some degree analogous to 
that used by Huizinga (1992) who examined optimal national tax policies with respect to R&D. 
Indeed, countries' policies concerning the tax treatment of interest expenditures of multinationals 
and of their R&D expenditures are to a certain extent similar. However, as the current model shows, 
the optimal tax treatment of interest expenditures as well as the effects of this treatment on the 
multinational's behaviour may differ to some degree from the R&D case. The main reason is the 
different nature of the assets the expenditures are related to (capital assets are pure private goods, 
while R&D assets are, at least, to some degree, public goods2). In terms of the model this implies 
that in case of interest expenditures, production in a country depends on the amount of capital 
employed in this country, while in the case of R&D it depends on the world-wide amount of R&D.  
 
Our model assumes that countries maximise their national income, which includes the tax revenues 
and the dividends distributed by the firm to the residents. In designing the corporate income tax 
system consisting of the tax rate and the fraction of world-wide interest expenditures allowed for 
deduction, countries take the tax parameters in other countries as given, but also take into account 
the reaction curve of the multinational's capital decisions. The character and size of capital decisions 
                                                                 
1 Under interest expenditures interest paid on debt used to finance capital is considered. 
2 A piece of knowledge developed and applied at a certain location, can be applied somewhere 
else at little extra cost and without reducing the capacity available at the original site (Caves, 
1996, p.4). 
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distortions in a country is determined by the interplay of the optimal tax system parameters in this 
and other world economies; these parameters are, in their turn, influenced by the location of the 
ownership of the multinational and by the degree of internationalisation of the company. In 
particular, the model shows that a country being a full owner of the multinational can enjoy a non-
distortion of capital decisions in a country or have more capital than optimally would have been the 
case. At the same time, for symmetric countries with equal ownership of the company it is not 
optimal to allow for interest deductions after a certain degree of internationalisation is reached, this 
implies no correction of the initial distortions introduced by the corporate income tax. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model set up and 
examines the optimal capital choice policy for the firm, together with the optimal national tax 
policies for the case of symmetric countries with no ownership of the multinational. Section 3 
introduces ownership in the production countries and differences between these countries in the 
model. Section 4 discusses the results of the current model in comparison to those of the R&D 
expenditures model. Section 5 provides information on countries’ practices concerning the 
treatment of interest expenditures deductions. Section 6 discusses possible extensions and presents a 
conclusion. Appendix A contains the relevant proofs, and Appendix B gives a numerical solution 
for a case not considered theoretically. 
 
 
2. Model set up and symmetric world solution.  
 
The model describes a single multinational firm operating n³2 plants in n countries. The output 
in every country is related to the quantity of capital employed in this country according to the 
production function f (Ki), such that f'>0, f"<0, f(0) = 0, f'(0) = ¥, f'(¥) = 0. The price of output 
is set to be unity. The firm finances its capital with debt and equity, the share of capital financed 
with debt is given by a. Debt financing is provided by country n+1, where no production is 
located3, at a given interest rate r, r>04. The interest to be paid on this debt equals Int = rD = 
raK = ra(Sl=1..nKl ). Equity financing can be provided by any of the n+1 countries, the 
distribution of equity capital among countries is given exogenously. The firm maximises its 
profit (output net of taxes and interest payments) and makes a decision on the quantity of overall 
capital employed (K) and the allocation of production among the n countries (Ki, i=1..n).  
                                                                 
3 Such a set up reflects the fact that financing and production decisions of a multinational company are 
being taken independently. 
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Countries 1 to n maximise their national incomes, which consist of corporate income tax 
revenues and dividends received by the citizens of the country on the equity owned. The tax 
systems are assumed to be territorial, i.e. countries only tax the multinational’s income generated 
within their borders. Country i taxes the income of the multinational at a rate ti, 0£ti£1, and 
allows for the deduction of a certain fraction qi, 0£qi£1 of world-wide interest expenditures 
incurred by the company (i.e. the apportionment method is used). In modelling the 
apportionment rule, the main feature of deduction allowances we want to account for is that 
deductions are connected to the world-wide interest expenditures, what implies that a more 
generous deduction rule in one country influences production world-wide, and has indirectly an 
impact on production in other countries. Introducing a fixed parameter qi presents the simplest 
way to incorporate this feature in the model. 
 
The taxable income of the multinational is defined as output net of the deduction for interest 
expenditures. Country i maximises its national income, and decides upon the values of ti and qi. 
Each country models its tax system (including tax rates and the deduction policy) taking into 
account that the multinational world-wide benefits from the favourable treatment of the interest 
expenditures, and, consequently, treasuries of other countries benefit too. The main purpose of 
the tax system is to capture profits that would otherwise go to foreign treasuries.  
 
Below the basic-case version of the model is presented with all equity provided by country n+1, 
and the n countries being symmetric, i.e. being the same with respect to all the parameters. Later 
ownership in production countries will be introduced, together with the differences between 
these countries. 
 
2.1 Optimisation problem of the firm 
The multinational chooses the overall quantity of capital employed K and the allocation of 
production Ki between the countries so as to maximise its after-tax profits world-wide p: 
 
p = Sl=1..n (1- tl)f(Kl) - (1 - Sl=1..n tl ql )rD - rE  
                  = Sl=1..n (1- tl)f(Kl) - (1 - aSl=1..n tl ql )rSl=1..nKl     (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 Country n+1 stands for a number of small world economies which provide financing without hosting 
production. Due to their small size they are not able to exercise any influence on world variables such 
as e.g. the interest rate.  
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The optimality condition for the firm’s plant in country i looks as follows: 
 
(1-ti)f'(Ki) - (1 - aSl=1..n tlql)r =0  (2) 
 
Expression (2) states that the quantity of capital Ki employed in country i is chosen so as to 
equalise the net-of-tax marginal product of capital in country i and the marginal cost of capital 
net of the value of the world-wide interest deductions. 
 
Below will be shown how the tax parameters ti and qi in each of the countries affect the firm’s 
production decisions. Straightforward total differentiation of (2) gives the following relationships 
between the quantity of capital employed in a country and the tax policies of this and other 
countries: 
 
where i = 1,..,n. 
where j ¹ i.  
 
where i = 1,..,n. 
 
According to (3) a higher tax rate in country i leads to more capital in country i if f’(Ki)< aqir, 
i.e. the share of world-wide costs of capital deductible from taxable income in country i exceeds 
the marginal product of capital at the plant in this country. Equation (4) shows that a higher tax 
rate in country i always leads to more capital in country j,  j¹ i. From (5) follows that allowing 
for more generous interest deductions in country i leads to a larger production at the 
multinational’s plants not only in this country, but also world-wide. 
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2.2 Optimisation problem of the country. National tax policies 
In a cooperative world countries will choose their tax parameters so as to avoid distorting the 
firm’s capital decisions. Non-distortion leads in other words to the same capital choice as in the 
world without taxes. FOC without taxes is: f’(Ki)=r (marginal product of capital equals its 
marginal cost), FOC with taxes is given by (2). Thus, the non-distortion condition yields: 
1- ti =1 - aål=1..n tl ql  or ti = aål=1..n tl ql .  
If ti > aål=1..n tl ql then the quantity of capital is too small in comparison with the no-tax case, 
and the tax system provides a net tax on capital. If  ti <aål=1..n tl ql then there is a net capital 
subsidy. Further will be shown that in a non-cooperative world without ownership the 
deductibility parameters are set such that the tax system implies a net tax on capital, while in a 
country owning the multinational fully, a net subsidy on capital or no distortion of capital 
decisions are possible.  
 
Country i designs its tax system (decides upon the values of ti,,qi) so as to maximise its national 
income, which equals the tax income: 
Ni = Ti = tif(Ki) - ti qi raSl=1..nKl (6) 
Note that since the national income consists only of the tax income, it is never optimal for a 
country to set ti equal to zero. Every country is assumed to act in Cournot-Nash fashion, i.e. 
taking the tax parameters of the other countries as given. In this setting qi =0 will be not optimal, 
if a marginal increase in production brought about by a marginal increase in qi will be larger than 
the share of world-wide interest expenditures allowed for deduction at the new value of qi. 
Moreover, countries will set their tax system parameters in such a way that 1-aSl=1..ntlql >0 
(otherwise it will be optimal for the company to increase capital to infinity; to prevent this 
countries will set their deduction parameters to zero). 
 
The Cournot-Nash assumption implies that the tax parameters are set so that: 
 
Equations (7) and (8) implicitly define optimal tax parameters from the perspective of country i, 
as functions of foreign and domestic tax parameters tl ,ql, l=1..n. Thus, (7) and (8) present the 
international Nash equilibrium in the tax parameters. 
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Proposition 1 shows a number of implications of (7) and (8) for the optimal values of ti and qi, 
i=1..n: 
 
Proposition 1 (proof: see appendix A) 
(i) dKi/dti <0 
(ii) $ N such that qi=0, i=1..n, n³N 
(iii) ti >aål=1..n tl ql 
 
Part (i) states that increasing the tax rate in country i leads to less capital employed by the 
multinational in this country. Part (ii) says that the optimal deduction parameter for the countries 
is equal to zero if the number of plants is larger than a certain value N. In other words, when 
internationalisation reaches a certain level, it becomes optimal not to allow for the deductions of 
interest expenditures. The intuition behind this statement is that at a certain degree of 
internationalisation the capital world-wide becomes so large that a marginal increase in 
production due to a marginal increase in qi does not compensate for the loss in tax revenues 
brought about by allowed deductions. Part (iii) states that the tax system imposes a net tax on 
capital in countries under consideration.  
 
3. Asymmetric world with ownership differences 
 
In this section the ownership in the production countries and the differences among these 
countries are introduced. The ownership ri (Sl=1..n+1rl =1)  of country i is defined as a fraction of 
equity of the multinational owned by the citizens of country i, i=1..n+1 and is considered as a 
proxy for the size of the country. We assume that the total of the company's profit is distributed 
to the equityholders, consequently, citizens of country i receive a fraction ri of the 
multinational's profits, this yield is included in the national income of the country. All other 
assumptions stay the same. 
 
 
 
3.1 Optimisation problem of the firm 
 
 9
The optimisation problem of the multinational described by the equations (1) and (2) does not 
change. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, in this case we cannot exclude the zero value of 
the tax rate parameter.  
  
Notice, that from (2) follows that ti > tj leads to Ki <Kj, what means that the deduction policy 
cannot change the sign of Ki -Kj, only its size. 
 
3.2 Optimisation problem of the country. National tax policies 
The optimisation problem of the country takes now the following form: to maximise 
 
Ni = Ti + ri p = f(Ki)[ ti +ri (1-ti )] + ri Si¹l (1-tl )f(Kl) – rSl=1..nKl [atiqi + ri (1 -a Sl=1..n tl ql )] (9) 
 
The following equations present the international Nash equilibrium for each of the n countries, 
implicitly defining optimal tax parameters from the perspective of country i, as functions of 
foreign and domestic tax parameters tl ,ql, l ¹ i: 
where use is made of (2). 
 
Substitution of the equations (3), (4) and (5) into (10) and (11), correspondingly, yields:  
 
Under the assumption ti ¹ 0 substituting (13) into (12), we get: 
 
The implications of  (10) and (11) for the optimal values of the tax system parameters are 
discussed below. The insights of the case of equal ownership ri = (1-rn+1)/n are similar to those 
of the case of no ownership discussed in section 2; we will not go into this case further. 
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Proposition 2 deals with the case ri = 1, rj =0 for j¹ i, i.e. the multinational is wholly owned by 
country i. 
 
Proposition 2 (proof: see appendix A) 
(i)  The equilibrium is: 
ti =0, qi can take any value; tj >0, j¹i 
(ii) dKj/dtj <0, j¹i 
(iii) ti =aål=1..n tl ql  if ql=0 
       ti <aål=1..n tl ql  if ql>0 
 
Part (i) states that the equilibrium in case one country owns the multinational completely, is a 
zero tax rate in that country (since there is no tax, the deduction parameter becomes not relevant) 
and positive tax rates in all the other countries. Part (ii) is the condition that the increasing tax 
rate in a country having no stake in the multinational leads to less capital in this country. Part 
(iii) says that the case under consideration results in a no distortion of capital decisions of the 
multinational in the country-owner if deduction parameters in other countries are zero, and in a 
net subsidy if deduction parameters in other countries are positive.  
 
4 Discussion of results  
In this section we discuss the intuition behind the result that distortions may differ per country 
both, in size and in character. While the net tax outcome corresponds with the results of the 
analysis of comparable kind of expenditures, R&D expenditures of the multinationals (analysed 
by Huizinga, 1992), the possibility of the net subsidy and non-distortion is in contrast with them.  
 
Let us first consider why a net subsidy on capital can appear. In a closed economy (i.e. if we 
consider each country individually) capital at the margin is taxed if the tax rate is larger than 
zero: 
 
since f'(Ki)-qi ra>0  (see (i) of Proposition 1 and (ii) of Proposition 2). 
 
However, in an open economy the effect can be opposite due to the existence of a negative 
externality on the foreign treasuries: 
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In case of country i having a large ownership of the multinational, (15) becomes small, and a 
marginal increase in the capital in country i leads to a marginal decrease in the world-wide tax 
revenues: dT/dKi<0. The situation is opposite in case of no ownership in the producing countries: 
marginal increase in tax revenues of country i as a result of a marginal increase in capital in this 
country overweighs the marginal decrease in tax revenues of other countries. Thus, per saldo we 
have a marginal increase in the world-wide tax revenues dT/dKi>0 as a result of the marginal 
increase in capital in country i. (Note, that effects on the world-wide tax revenues described 
above, are pure effects of the marginal change in capital, and do not account for the influence of 
changes in tax system parameters, through which this change has occurred). 
  
In the case of R&D, however, a marginal change in R&D results in a marginal change in the 
same direction of tax revenues in all the countries, which implies a net tax on R&D. The 
intuition behind this is based on the fact that, in contrast to capital assets, R&D assets are, at least 
to some degree, a public good. Consequently, no country can capture all the benefits from 
increasing R&D and make others pay for it. In terms of the model, the different nature of capital 
and R&D assets is reflected in the production function specification. Thus, in the model 
described above production in a country depends on the amount of capital employed in this 
particular country, while in the R&D model production in a country depends on the overall 
amount of R&D.  
 
5. Actual tax treatment of interest expenditures: some international evidence 
 
The share of interest expenditures of multinationals that can be allocated to the production costs 
world-wide depends on the income tax provisions and interest deductibility rules of countries 
where the multinational operates5. Most countries allow for the deduction of interest on 
borrowed funds used for the purpose of earning income within the country6. Two fundamental 
approaches to attributing interest expenditures to geographic sources of income are tracing and 
apportionment. While the former involves tracing the use of the borrowed funds to prove their 
                                                                 
5 The information in this paragraph is from IFA (1994). 
6 IFA (1994) analysed policies regarding interest expenditures deductions of 29 OECD countries; only 
Singapore was found not to allow interest expenditure deductions when calculating the taxable profits 
of resident multinationals. 
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connection with a particular source of income; the latter implies allocation of these funds to 
taxpayer’s sources of income according to a certain rule. The tracing approach has up to now 
been used by the majority of OECD countries, with several of them requiring apportionment 
when tracing is not feasible. However, in many cases the apportionment requirement is not 
supported with providing an explicit formula for calculating the fraction of total interest 
expenditures incurred, that is allowed for deduction within a country. Thus, most EU countries 
apart from Italy do not have statutory apportionment rules. Where present, statutory 
apportionment formulae used differ considerably per country and may be based on the value of 
the taxpayers income-earning assets (USA, Norway), but also on other criteria such as e.g. gross 
revenues (Italy, Japan, Korea). Of all countries the USA has the most explicitly described 
apportioning formula and detailed statutory rules for determining the geographic source of 
revenue and expenses.  
 
The interplay between interest deduction rules of various countries hosting the multinational 
determines the overall interest deductibility. As an example we consider the tax treatment of 
interest expenditures of an American multinational, since the USA has the most developed policy 
in this respect. The country taxes the world-wide income of domestic corporations but allows for 
a foreign tax credit in order to avoid double taxation. The issue of interest allocation is crucial for 
American corporations since interest allocated to foreign source income reduces the maximum 
amount of the foreign tax credit. The foreign permanent establishments, which are taxed 
territorially, need to determine the amount of the interest expense attributable to their USA 
income for the corporate income tax purposes. A three-step procedure introduced in 1980 is 
generally applicable up to now, and acts as follows7. First, the U.S. assets of the company are 
determined and valued in accordance with the existing statutory rules. Second, the total amount 
of US-connected liabilities is calculated by multiplying the US-connected assets by either the 
corporation’s ‘actual ratio’ of world-wide liabilities to world-wide assets or an elective ‘fixed 
ratio’, which amounts to 95% for banks and 50% for other taxpayers. Finally, the amount of 
interest expense attributable to the US liabilities is calculated by adjusting the actual interest paid 
by the US branch on its book liabilities, to reflect the difference between the US branch 
liabilities and US-connected liabilities. 
  
 
 
The tax treatment of the overall interest expenditures of the American multinational will, 
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however, depend on the part of the world it operates in. In quite a few countries the 
multinational's interest expenditures will be treated according to the tracing approach (most of 
the EU countries use this approach) 8. Apportionment is required, e.g. by Italy, Japan, Norway. 
However, since the apportionment rules differ per country, the full deduction of world-wide 
interest expenditures will not necessarily occur. In other countries (e.g. some Eastern-European 
countries), however, the situation is possible that no part of interest expenditures is allowed for 
deduction or the deduction is allowed only within a special range leading to less than full 
deduction of the world-wide interest expenditures. Thus, for example, in the Russian Federation 
up to recently only interest payments on bank loans (as opposed to inter-company loans) were 
allowed for deduction, with interest rate limited to the official rate established by the Central 
Bank of Russia. However, Russian current legislation provisions establish the priority of 
international agreements over the provisions of domestic tax law, which results in more relaxed 
rules for loans obtained by non-resident entities9.  
 
As shown above, the uncoordinated tax policies of individual countries with respect to the 
interest expenditures of multinationals generally allow for debt shifting and can result in a less 
than full deduction of interest paid world-wide. The outcome depends on the particular countries 
where the multinational operates. Moreover, the policies of countries are not necessarily 
optimally designed, what leads to large divergences not only in the tax system parameters as 
predicted by the model, but also in tax system approaches, and creates distortions.  Some steps to 
optimise countries' policies have been done by the OECD Model Tax Convention: Attribution of 
Income to Permanent Establishments (OECD, 1994). Thus, most of bilateral treaties between 
countries conform to this convention.  
 
 
6. Conclusions and possible extensions  
 
This paper has analysed the tax treatment by national governments of interest expenditures of 
multinational firms under the apportionment approach. The following conclusions can be drawn 
from the analysis. First, uncoordinated national tax policies generally result in a distortion of the 
capital decisions of the multinational. Depending on the size of the ownership of the country in 
the multinational and the degree of internationalisation of the company, the distortion of capital 
decisions in a country can vary in form (from a net tax on capital to a net subsidy on capital or a 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 This description is based on Rienstra (1996). 
8 The information in this paragraph is from IFA (1994), Almakaeva (1997). 
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non-distortion) and in size. This possibility of countries' differences in distortions faced may 
have implications both, for the incentives different countries have to using the apportionment 
approach, and, once the approach is used, for countries' willingness to cooperate with each other 
in order to eliminate the distortion. Second, the different nature of capital and R&D assets 
influences the optimal tax treatment of related expenditures as shown by the difference of the 
current results from those for the optimal tax treatment of R&D expenditures of multinationals. 
Finally, the present tax systems are far from being optimal with respect to the treatment of the 
interest expenditures of multinationals. As a consequence, multinationals possess at the moment 
considerable opportunities of manipulating the amount of the corporate income tax to be paid 
world-wide, by means of debt shifting.  
 
The current model uses the ownership parameter as a proxy for the size of the country (large 
countries are more likely to have a larger ownership of the multinational). Another proxy for the 
size (as suggested by Huizinga (1992)) can be the number of plants that the multinational 
operates in a country (this number can differ per country). Let mi be the number of plants in 
country i, such that m=Sl=1..n ml and m>n. Then for country i (8) becomes: 
 
Equation (8’) implies that in the world with no ownership and symmetric tax rates the 
deductibility parameter will be positively related to the number of plants in a country. Large 
countries with many production facilities, such as the US, will consequently have bigger 
incentives to allow for the deduction of interest expenditures.  
 
Another possible extension has to do with the fact that countries usually value tax revenues 
higher than the revenues received by individuals in the form of dividends. Consider introducing a 
parameter l³1 showing the weight a country attaches to its tax revenues, when the dividends 
received by the residents are taken with the weight one. The national income will look then as 
follows: Ni = lTi + rip. The general pattern of results will, however, not change considerably 
in this case. 
 
In general the results obtained in the model suggest a scope for international cooperation with 
respect to the rules for apportioning the interest expenses of the multinationals between their 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
9 Such agreements exist, e.g. with almost all the EU members. 
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income sources, but warn that countries might have different incentives to cooperate. To reach 
the efficiency in the capital decisions of the multinational it is necessary that the corporation be 
able to exactly expense the total of its interest expenditures world-wide.  
 
 
Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(i) Substituting (5) into (8) and taking into account that the countries are symmetric, we get: 
 
from where follows: f'(Ki)>qiran>qira. (This inequality also implies 
f(Ki)>qiranKi=qiraSl=1..nKl). Consequently, 
 
 (ii) Two last terms of expression (7) are negative and they increase with the increase in the 
number of plants n. When n exceeds a certain value N, expression (7) becomes negative, and to 
preserve the equality the optimal value of qi should be put equal to zero. 
(iii) From (A1) the following expression for qi is obtained: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rewriting the expression for Sl=1..nql = nqi and substituting the expression for f’(Ki) from (2): 
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since f”(Ki)<0. Now ti >ati ål=1..nql =aål=1..n tlql. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) If  ri = 1, (10) and (11) become: 
 
ti =0, qi - any  presents a feasible solution.  
 
Assuming ti ¹0, from (14) we get: f’(Ki) = rqi. Substituting this result into (11) yields qi=0, any 
ti¹0 as a solution. This solution does not however lead to an equilibrium world-wide (f’(Ki) = rqi 
= 0, what implies Ki= ¥; this is not a feasible solution as can be checked by substituting it in 
optimisation problems of other countries). 
 
(i) Analogous to Proposition 1(i) above 
(ii) Follows from ti=0, qj=0 and ti=0, qj>0. 
 
Appendix B. 
 
In this appendix we provide a numerical example based on the model simulation for a case with 
countries differing with respect to the ownership in the multinational, and this ownership lying 
between 0 and 1. The simulation proceeds as follows: 2 countries are considered with ownership 
parameters changing from 0 to 0.49 and from 0.51 to 0.99, correspondingly. The production 
function is taken to be ln(Ki+1), the other exogenous parameters are set to r=0.45, a=0.3. 
Countries can choose tax system parameters from a discrete set: tiÎ[0;0.9], qjÎ[0;1] with an 
interval of 0.1. The optimal tax systems parameters for both countries are calculated as an 
outcome of the Nash game in pure strategies. 
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Table 1 presents outcomes of the Nash game for 17 pairs of ownership parameters and is to be 
read as follows. Ownership shares for countries 1 and 2 are given in the first two columns, 
correspondingly; changes are taken with an interval of 0.03. Four next columns present values of 
optimal tax system parameters for countries (note that due to the discrete character of the game, 
in several cases more than 1 Nash solutions are possible). The last three columns consider the 
character of distortions of capital decisions the tax systems yield (see discussion of possible 
distortion outcomes in section 2.2). Thus, column aS reports the values of aSl=1,2tlql which can 
be compared with the values of the tax rates in countries (ti>aSl=1,2tlql implies a net tax on 
capital in country i, ti<aSl=1,2tlql implies a net subsidy on capital in country i, ti =aSl=1,2tlql 
implies non-distortion). The next two columns present proxies for how much the value of capital 
employed in country i deviates from its optimal value in this country (the term calculated in the 
column for country i equals f'(Ki)/r, and should be equal to 1 in the optimal situation).  
 
The value of a country's ownership of the multinational does indeed influence the distortive 
character of the world tax system with respect to capital in this country. Thus, as we could expect 
on the basis of the theoretical results, in a country having a larger ownership of the company the 
distortion of capital and production decisions will generally be smaller than in a country having a 
smaller ownership of the multinational. However, the current results should be treated carefully 
and account should be taken of the influence of the discrete character of the game on the 
outcomes.  
 
Table 1. Simulation results. 
             r1            r2             t1             q1            t2             q2      aS (1-t1)/(1-aS) (1-t2)/(1-aS) 
0.49 0.51 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.168 2.773 2.773 
0.49 0.51 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.216 3.92 3.92 
0.49 0.51 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.216 3.92 3.92 
0.46 0.54 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.168 2.773 2.773 
0.46 0.54 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.216 3.92 3.92 
0.43 0.57 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.168 2.773 2.773 
0.43 0.57 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.201 3.995 2.663 
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.168 2.77 2.773 
0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.201 3.995 2.663 
0.37 0.63 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.201 3.995 2.663 
0.34 0.66 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.201 3.995 2.663 
0.34 0.66 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.198 4.01 2.673 
0.31 0.69 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.198 4.01 2.673 
0.28 0.72 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.201 3.995 2.663 
0.28 0.72 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.198 4.01 2.673 
0.25 0.75 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.201 3.995 2.663 
0.25 0.75 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.198 4.01 2.673 
0.22 0.78 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.198 4.01 2.673 
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0.22 0.78 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.201 3.995 2.663 
0.19 0.81 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.18 4.1 2.05 
0.16 0.84 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.18 4.1 2.05 
0.13 0.87 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.18 4.1 2.05 
0.13 0.87 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.174 4.13 2.065 
0.1 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.138 4.31 1.724 
0.07 0.93 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.153 4.235 1.694 
0.07 0.93 0.7 0 0.4 0.7 0.084 3.053 1.527 
0.04 0.96 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.108 4.46 1.487 
0.04 0.96 0.7 0 0.3 0.7 0.063 3.123 1.339 
0.04 0.96 0.8 0 0.4 0.8 0.096 4.52 1.507 
0.01 0.99 0.7 0 0.1 0.7 0.021 3.263 1.088 
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